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Abstract 
This exploratory paper is part of wider research project that seeks to examine how the 
Westminster parliament is responding to political disengagement from traditional political 
processes and institutions, in the context of parliament’s linkage function and its relationship 
with the public. It examines evidence from recent extra-parliamentary Commissions on this 
issue, and compares their findings with those of the House of Commons Modernisation 
Committee. It draws on a short series on interviews conducted with MPs and peers, in order to 
assess how parliamentarians perceive the problem of disengagement, what they think 
parliament should do to address it, and what this tells us about how they view parliament’s 
linkage function, and its relationship with the public, at the start of the twenty-first century. 
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Introduction 
In 2001, the turnout at the UK general election fell to 59.4%, down from 71.6% in 1997, with 
five million fewer voters participating between the two polls.1 Although the evidence seemed 
to point to a general trend of decline in voter turnout in the post-1945 era, the extent of the 12-
point drop-off between 1997 and 2001 appeared rather dramatic, and stimulated discussion 
about an ‘apathetic landslide’ and the nature of political disengagement that was evident in 
Britain.2 The situation seemed compounded by the evidence that the turnout for the 18-24 age 
group had dropped by 27% since 1997 to just 39% in 2001.3 Worse still, the turnout at the 
2005 general election increased by only two points to 61%, and with a further fall-off in the 
18-24 year-old turnout to 37%.4 This prompted much soul searching within the media and 
academia alike about what the decline in voting numbers since 1997 implied about the nature 
of political engagement and for the health of representative democracy more broadly. For 
example, the Electoral Commission, in its analysis of the 2005 election, argued that ‘there is a 
clear need to re-connect people with politics, and vice-versa, beyond moments of (relatively) 
high political drama such as general elections’.5 
Much work has been done to assess the extent, nature and cause of political 
disengagement in Britain. However, there has been rather less evidence of an attempt to 
analyse how parliament, as the core of our representative democracy, is responding to 
disengagement. Such an analysis is needed, not for the purposes of facilitating the usual (and 
unfortunate) scepticism that abounds in examining how parliament responds to political and 
societal pressures, but because it facilitates an insight into how parliament and 
parliamentarians conceptualise the linkage function. Rather than concluding that declining 
voter numbers point to an apathetic public, we should instead conclude that they point to a 
public that wants a different kind of relationship with its political institutions, and that wants 
its political institutions to fulfil their functions in new ways. While there is much to discover 
about how parliament and parliamentarians are thinking about their linkage function in the 
context of political disengagement, these discoveries should also prompt political scientists to 
rethink how we approach parliament’s crucial linkage function, and the measures by which 
we gauge its fulfilment. 
This paper, in assessing how parliamentarians and other interested groups think about 
the linkage function, represents a different way of approaching the problem of political 
disengagement. It does this by shifting the analytical lens away from investigations into the 
causes of political disengagement and instead applying it to how parliamentarians themselves 
perceive the causes of disengagement, and how this informs their views on the linkage 
function. The paper begins with a discussion of parliament’s linkage function, how it has been 
traditionally understood, and what some of the problems are with how parliament fulfils this 
function. The paper then proceeds to examine current discussions about the nature of the 
relationship between parliament and the public. In recent years, much work has been 
undertaken by non-parliamentary organisations, seeking to discover how parliament can 
better perform its linkage role, and the findings of these investigations will be summarised, 
along with commentary about what those findings suggest about the changing nature of that 
role. The paper will then examine parliament’s own response to the situation for the purposes 
of comparison, and will utilise a series of interviews the author conducted with MPs in early 
2006, in order to assess how parliamentarians perceive their linkage role in the context of a 
disengaged public. It will conclude with a brief discussion about what this all means for 
parliament’s relationship with the public, and for the way in which we conceptualise the 
linkage function. This paper is an exploratory analysis of some of the issues surrounding this 
problem, designed to map out the next stage of the writing process: it is therefore designed to 
prompt questioning rather than definitive answers. 
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Parliament’s Linkage Function 
Parliaments have many varied functions, which have been examined and categorised in many 
ways6, but one of the most basic functions is that of linking government and governed. By 
providing a forum where the concerns of the electorate can be aired and (possibly) addressed, 
and where the actions of government can be explained and scrutinised, parliament facilitates 
the interest articulation and conflict resolution necessary for a healthy democracy, as well as 
providing legitimation for the system of government that is in place.  
While the relationship between parliament and government is quite well understood – 
for example in terms of how parliament scrutinises government, examines its legislation and 
activities, questions its ministers, and so on – the relationship between parliament and the 
electorate has received rather less attention.7 Norton explains the value of the relationship, and 
the linkages that the relationship provides, in these terms: 
 
How parliamentarians act on behalf of citizens can generate a latent body of support. 
That action may involve persuasion. That persuasion may be two-way, with 
parliamentarians influencing the actions of ministers on the one hand and citizens on 
the other. That persuasion may be at the collective level – parliamentarians 
influencing the policy or actions of government or of organised groups (attentive 
publics) or the wider citizenry (general public) – or at the level of the individual, 
where an MPs actions influence the behaviour of a minister or citizen.8 
 
The fundamental reason why parliament is able to perform its linkage role is because it 
is the representative assembly, and it therefore facilitates linkage of government and governed 
as a result of its representational characteristics, and legitimates the political system. Walter 
Bagehot’s notions about the functions of the House of Commons still have resonance today in 
terms of popular understandings about parliament, and three of the functions he identified 
have particular relevance in terms of the linkage function 9 The ‘expressive’ function involved 
the Commons’ duty ‘to express the mind of the English people on all matters which come 
before it.’ The ‘teaching’ function involved imparting to the electorate what they did not 
already know about the activities of government, and its programme of action. The 
‘informing’ function involved the airing of public grievances so that the government could be 
made aware of them.10 
However, the nature and character of the British state and its historical development 
have meant that representative government has been prioritised above representative 
democracy,11 with particular consequences for how representation, and the attendant linkage 
function performed by parliament, are understood today. As Judge explains, ‘representation 
both serves to include ‘the people’ in decision-making – indirectly and infrequently through 
the process of elections – yet, simultaneously, to exclude them from direct and continuous 
participation in the decision making process.’12 One particular problem of relevance here is 
that the practice of representation in the UK poses problems in terms of how the electorate 
exercise popular control over their representatives. Although MPs act as trustees rather than 
delegates in the UK model, this has been tempered by the understanding that if the electorate 
is unhappy with their representative, they can vote them out of parliament at the next election. 
Of course, the mechanics of party representation make this option somewhat less 
straightforward than perhaps might be preferable. But there is more to the problem than this, 
as Judge summarises: 
 
The vagaries of the first-past-the-post electoral system and its ramifications for the 
‘strength’ and ‘responsiveness’ of representative government, and the limited 
opportunities for public participation in decision making and hence the limited form 
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of representative democracy itself, have been sufficient to prompt concern about a 
growing de-legitimation of representative processes in Britain.13 
 
The almost paternalistic description of the linkage function provided by Bagehot 
contextualises the reasons why there are the limited opportunities for public participation 
noted by Judge. Although Bagehot’s description is from 1867, it casts a long shadow over the 
way parliament engages with its linkage function today. Indeed, the evidence is now clear that 
there are fundamental problems with the way in which parliament acts as a linkage between 
government and governed, and the way that it interprets its role within the political system in 
terms of its relationship with the public. 
 
The Engagement Audits – Describing the Linkage Gap 
Over the three years in which the Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society have held 
the joint Audits of Political Engagement,14 the indicators measured have yielded relatively 
consistent results. The audits used six indicators to measure engagement in terms of 
knowledge and interest, action and participation, and efficacy and satisfaction, and the results 
displayed a reasonable level of consistency across the three years. A few key points may be 
gleaned from the audit that will be of use here. 
First, in the most recent audit, although 56% of those surveyed reported an interest in 
politics, only 39% felt they were knowledgeable about politics. Second, although 55% would 
vote if a general election was held, only 14% described themselves as political activists. 
Perhaps of most concern, only 33% of respondents agreed that by getting involved in politics, 
people could change the way the country was run, and only 34% believed the present system 
of governing works well.15  
The audit also uncovered additional evidence that might be of concern to 
parliamentarians when formulating their response to disengagement. For example, when 
asked what they understood by the term politics, only 11% of respondents mentioned 
Parliament in their answers. The audit’s findings about the kinds of political activities that 
people are involved in, or might become involved in, also helps frame the discussion. Only 
13% were willing to take part in a governmental or parliamentary consultation, and only 4% 
had actually done so in the past, while, at the other end of the spectrum, 72% were willing to 
sign a petition, with 50% reporting having already done so.16 The 2004 Audit also reported 
figures about satisfaction with parliament: only 36% were satisfied, and 32% unsatisfied, with 
27% expressing neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction.17 
The findings from these audits have been complemented by additional research carried 
out by the Hansard Society, looking at the issue of engagement with specific reference to 
parliament.18 This qualitative work highlighted a considerable lack of knowledge about 
parliament that acted as a barrier to engagement. Such a finding is perhaps not surprising, but 
of more concern was the finding that amongst those who do feel informed, and who want to 
make their views known, there is a sense that they are not actually listened to.19 This report 
concluded that ‘the lack of adequate information and a projection of an aloof, unfriendly 
political system mean that participants felt uninvolved in politics and uninvited’.20 
These findings, and others contained in the audits, have implications in terms of how 
parliament can, and should, respond to disengagement, and also for how we think about 
parliament’s linkage function more broadly, as we shall see later. 
 
Parliament and Disengagement - The Views of the Commissions 
Perhaps one of the most reassuring features of British representative democracy is that 
whenever there is a problem or crisis in its functioning, an investigative commission will 
inevitably emerge to take a long, hard look at the situation. There have been two significant 
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commissions in recent years looking at how to improve the functioning of democracy in 
Britain. The Hansard Society Commission on the Communication of Parliamentary 
Democracy published its report in 2005, Members Only? Parliament in the Public Eye, on the 
specific issue of how parliament presents itself to the public. The Power Commission, an 
independent inquiry into Britain’s democracy established by the Joseph Rowntree Reform 
Trust, published its report in 2006, Power to the People, on the general functioning of 
democracy. These reports were extensive and detailed in their diagnosis of the causes of 
disengagement, how these informed the solutions that were required, and what these solutions 
would require of parliament.  
 
Members Only? Parliament in the Public Eye 
The Hansard Society Commission on the Communication of Parliamentary Democracy, 
chaired by Lord Puttnam (and hereafter referred to as the Puttnam Commission) focused 
specifically on how parliament’s current communication approach hampered its role as a 
representative institution, and how this contributed to political disengagement more generally. 
According to the report, parliament’s communication strategy mattered a great deal: 
 
Because if people cannot understand what Parliament does, or why it does it, if 
people find its culture and language alienating, if voters cannot easily present their 
views and questions and believe they can make a difference, and if there is no 
continuing ‘conversation’ between Parliament and people, then Parliament cannot 
fulfil its purpose effectively.21 
 
The crucial point is that, as the national representative institution, parliament must perform its 
linkage role to an optimum level, in order to provide a forum for the discussion of important 
issues, facilitate political discourse, and engage with the plurality of viewpoints that exist in 
society. 
However, in assessing how parliament fulfils its linkage role, and how it could fulfil it 
better, we come upon the problem that has long puzzled those who are interested in making 
parliament more ‘effective’ – parliament lacks the corporate institutional identity that would 
make it easier to perform the linkage role, because of the impact that government and party 
has had at Westminster. Consequently, analysis of any kind of parliamentary reform 
necessarily involves an examination of the powers and independence of parliament, and how 
these impact on its performance. Such an analysis was beyond the remit of the Commission, 
but the report nevertheless stated that ‘a Parliament which involved and engaged the public 
more effectively in its work would respond to such increased attention with improved 
performance’.22 
The Puttnam Commission highlighted two broad sets of problems with parliament that 
contributed to political disengagement: levels of participation; and general political and social 
trends. In terms of levels of participation, the Commission pointed to a number of likely 
issues for concern when analysing the downward trend in voting numbers, which drew on the 
figures provided by previous Audits of Engagement: 
• Poor knowledge of parliament and how it works 
• Low satisfaction with parliament 
• People are more likely to be engaged if they think that ‘getting involved works’ 
• Parliament’s declining media profile 
In terms of political and social trends, the Commission flagged up a number of issues that had 
to be considered: 
• People remain strongly engaged with political, social and ethical issues, but there 
has been a decline in identification with political parties 
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• Parliament now has to ‘compete’ with a number of other political bodies and 
processes – such as the devolved assemblies, the EU institutions, the rise of 
judicial review and think-tanks – if it is to attract attention 
• Important changes have taken place within parliament, with the most effective 
activity moving away from the chamber to the committee corridor, Portcullis 
House and the offices of individual MPs 
• The development of a rights-based political culture and a less deferential society 
• The rise of consumerism and the expectations of a customer-focused approach in 
all aspects of life, including politics 
• A changing media culture influenced by the impact of new technologies 
With all these considerations in play, the Puttnam Commission made a series of 
recommendations for how parliament could improve its communications approach, and thus 
begin to tackle the issue of political disengagement (although the Commission was clear that 
improved communications would not by itself ‘solve’ the problem). This involved the 
development of a proper parliamentary communication strategy, with recommendations that 
included: 
• Better use of the internet, and more interactivity, such as online consultations 
• Better strategies for young people, through parliamentary citizenship education and 
community outreach 
• Making parliament more understandable to those who follow its work 
Although this brief summary makes the report recommendations seem a little lame, they are 
at times rather radical suggestions, at least when measured against the relatively slow pace of 
reform and change often found at Westminster, and included recommendations for 
organisational and structural change that was quite extensive (and therefore perhaps unlikely). 
Yet the Commission was nonetheless adamant that wholesale change was exactly what was 
required: 
 
Piecemeal or incremental changes as a response to this report would go against the 
fundamental conclusions of our work – that the administration of parliament must be 
transformed, that the mindset of Parliament has to change to take into account the 
public’s point of view and that communication has to be radically reorganised as a 
central democratic priority if parliament is to function effectively.23 
 
The proactive nature of the kinds of things that the Puttnam Commission recommended is at 
odds with the Bagehot description of parliament’s linkage function. This may come as no real 
surprise, given that Bagehot’s work is over 150 years old. However, what is perhaps more 
surprising is that the recommendations are also at odds with parliament’s general approach to 
communicating with citizens, no more clearly demonstrated than by the fact that the Puttnam 
Commission was deemed necessary in the first place. Parliament’s approach to 
communication is still very much in the vein of ‘teaching’ as described by Bagehot, as even 
the most cursory glance at the parliamentary website shows.24 Parliament’s approach to 
communication is particularly ‘top-down’ and actually makes meaningful ‘bottom-up’ 
communication, in the manner of a conversation or dialogue, very difficult, one of the 
problems the Puttnam Commission were trying to address. We will return to this point later. 
 
Power to the People 
Costing a reputed £800,000 of Joseph Rowntree money, the Power Commission got a bit of a 
media bashing upon the publication of its report in February 2006. While there is no doubt 
that the Commission made a range of apparently ‘common sense’ recommendations without 
then providing real suggestions about how they might be achieved, the report is nevertheless 
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useful in our analysis of how parliament should engage with its linkage function. Of most use, 
perhaps, is the Commission’s analysis of why people are disengaged from traditional political 
processes and institutions in the first place. 
The Commission outlined two sets of accounts for why people are disengaged from 
politics. The first set it termed ‘Red Herrings’,25 because these accounts offered dubious 
reasons for disengagement, and the Commission felt satisfied, based on the evidence it 
collected, that disengagement was not caused by: 
• An apathetic and uninterested public with a weak sense of civic duty 
• Widespread economic and political contentment 
• The supposedly low calibre of politicians 
• The lack of competitive elections 
• An overly negative news media 
• Lack of time on the part of the citizens 
More convincing, according to the Commission, were the following accounts26: 
• Citizens do not feel that the processes of formal democracy offer them enough 
influence over political decisions 
• The main political parties are widely perceived to be too similar and lacking in 
principle 
• The electoral system is widely perceived as leading to unequal and wasted votes 
• Political parties and elections require citizens to commit to too broad a range of 
policies 
• Many people feel they lack information or knowledge about formal politics 
• Voting procedures are regarded by some as inconvenient and unattractive 
Similarly to the Puttnam Commission, the Power Commission pointed to deep-rooted social 
and political change, centred around post-industrialisation, that has produced a new kind of 
citizen that is unwilling to accept the deferential strictures of previous eras. In addition, the 
emergence of ‘permanently marginalised groups in society’ further exacerbated the problems 
of disengagement.27 For too many citizens, the central problems with the way that democracy 
functions are that: it fails to take their views and interests into account; political parties are 
held in contempt; and voting is seen as a waste of time because of the nature of the electoral 
system.28 
The Power Commission made a range of recommendations designed to ‘create a 
political system which allows citizens a more direct and focused influence on the political 
decisions that concern them.’29 Of most relevance for our purposes here are those that related 
to changes that parliament should make in order to address concerns about disengagement. 
Many of these recommendations are responses to long-standing concerns about the nature of 
executive-legislative relations at Westminster, and in this regard, the argument of the 
Commission was that the structural basis of the political system is itself a turn-off for the 
public. Indeed, some of the recommendations have an idealistic wish-list tone to them, and 
are composed of the kinds of things that seem almost banal in their obviousness until you 
realise how hard it actually is to secure any of them: reducing the influence of the whips and 
increasing the powers of the select committees fall into this category. That is not to say that 
these goals are not worthy – rather, the point is that making heart-felt calls to secure such 
changes will not in itself secure them, although this gets into slightly different conceptual 
waters.30 Although the likelihood of the recommendations being implemented is clearly 
important, we are focusing for now on the nature of the recommendations. 
What the Power Commission does stress is that the relationship that parliament 
maintains with the public is no longer tenable. As noted earlier, the basis of the 
representational link between MP and constituent is that of a trustee. The Power Report states, 
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however, that ‘the Burkean notion that MPs must trust more to their own opinions than to 
those of their constituents now needs some revising for an era of educated, self-confident and 
less deferential citizens’.31 In revising the relationship, the Commission calls for a much more 
proactive parliament, and for it to have more powers to initiate legislation and public inquiries 
and to act on public petitions.32 This would be just one step towards enabling citizens to have 
more influence over political decisions. The Commission’s evidence suggested that ‘many 
people want more influence over political decisions, but regard elections as far too blunt a 
tool for the exercise of that influence’.33 The report endorses a new approach to democratic 
engagement based on the utilisation of more deliberative and direct mechanisms as a way to 
complement the present processes of representative government. There are a variety of 
suggestions in the report for how this ‘culture of participation’ might be fostered, including a 
recommendation for MPs to ‘make more use of innovative engagement techniques’.34 The 
Commission argue that ‘what is lacking is the existence of formal, resourced and high-profile 
methods by which all MPs can listen and respond to the concerns of their constituents 
between elections.’35 
However, as hinted at earlier, outlining a reform agenda is an entirely different thing 
from actually implementing one. The Commission found it ‘disheartening’ that, during its 
discussions with MPs, ‘not only was [there] no clear agenda for reform expressed by either 
one or the whole panel of politicians, but there was also a resistance, even a tetchiness, when 
some of the ideas we have been considering were put to the witnesses.’36 The reason for this 
defensiveness seemed clear to the Commission: 
 
Disengagement has arisen because a disjunction now exists between the way formal 
democratic politics is structured and conducted in Britain and the values, interests, 
expectations and lifestyles of the British people. The failure of politicians is not the 
way they behave in their professional lives but the fact that they have not yet 
developed a strategic and thoroughgoing response to address this disjunction.37 
 
That this is so can most clearly seen by comparing the preceding discussion of the content of 
the Puttnam and Power Commissions with that of the relevant reports from the House of 
Commons Modernisation Committee and the views of interested MPs collected during recent 
interviews with the author. 
 
The House of Commons’ Approach to Disengagement 
The House of Commons’ Modernisation Committee – a select committee established in 1997 
to examine, perhaps not surprisingly, how the House could be modernised – published its 
report on the issue of disengagement in June 2004. Entitled Connecting Parliament with the 
Public, it remarked that ‘the decline in political participation and engagement in recent years, 
as well as in levels of trust in politicians, political parties and the institutions of State … 
should be of particular concern to the House of Commons.’38 One of the most interesting 
things about the report emerges immediately, with respect to what the Committee thinks is 
causing disengagement: ‘Lower levels of trust [in politicians] are translating into a 
disconnection from the institutions of democracy.’39 In this, and a few other short sentences, 
the Committee diagnose the reasons for disengagement, and pinpoint the cause as declining 
levels of trust. This contrasts sharply with the diagnoses offered by both the Puttnam and 
Power Commissions, both of which described a complex set of interrelated factors underlying 
the problem, but which, crucially, were all underpinned by the analysis that people did not 
feel they had enough influence in decision making and that they were not properly listened to. 
Indeed, declining levels of trust are in many ways a symptom of disengagement, rather than a 
cause. The Modernisation Committee report therefore begins its work without the kind of 
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(relatively) sophisticated analysis that informed the work of the Commissions, and this has 
consequences in that appropriate solutions to a problem are dependent on there being an 
accurate analysis of the problem in the first place. 
The discourse used in the report reveals the way in which the Committee has 
conceptualised the nature of the connection and linkage between parliament and the public. 
The report states that ‘for parliamentary democracy to thrive the public must understand and 
engage with parliament itself.’40 Yet, at that crucial discursive moment in the report, it fails to 
state that parliament must also engage with the public. The two kinds of engagement are 
different from each other, clearly, but by failing to state this, the Committee reveal something 
important about their view of the linkage and connection function, that is confirmed by the 
rest of the report: that their conceptualisation is firmly rooted in the notion of ‘teaching’ the 
public in the tradition of Bagehot, rather than in developing the sort of two-way 
communication process that both the Puttnam and Power Commissions prioritised. This idea 
that a better relationship between parliament and public can be fostered by improving the 
‘teaching’ or dissemination of what parliament does is highlighted just a few paragraphs later: 
 
It serves no-one if we make it difficult for voters to understand what their elected 
representatives are doing … the Commons can make itself more accessible to those 
outside, both as interested visitors and as citizens wishing to be more involved in 
proceedings, it can do more to make it easier for people to understand the work of 
parliament, and it can do more to communicate its activity to the world outside.41 
 
These notions of making the House, its work and its procedure easier to ‘understand’ and 
more ‘accessible’, and of securing improved communication of its work to the ‘outside’ are 
almost paternalistic in approach. There is the reference about improving accessibility to those 
who want to be ‘more involved’ in proceedings, and this does indeed feed into some of the 
Committee’s recommendations. However, the extent to which these represent a move towards 
the kinds of solutions that seem necessary if the arguments of the Puttnam and Power 
Commissions are to be believed, is somewhat less clear. The Committee’s recommendations 
fall into five broad areas: connecting with young people; provision of information for the 
public; visitors to the parliamentary estate; public petitions; and the House of Commons and 
the media.  
In terms of connecting with young people, the report essentially argues for an extension 
of the kinds of work already done by parliament: more educational resources, better tours for 
young people, more outreach work, and the publication of a new voter’s guide to be sent to 
people on their eighteenth birthday.42 This kind of endeavour, as an extension of work that the 
House already does, is useful in as much as it is the youngest voters who are least likely to 
vote. However, the emphasis of these efforts, at least as they are explained in the Committee’s 
report, is to explain the work of parliament to young people, with little comment offered on 
how these educational resources could also be geared towards also involving young people in 
parliamentary processes, rather than simply explaining them. That is not to say that such 
efforts are not already being made by the Parliamentary Education Unit, only that the 
Committee’s report made no mention of them, thus revealing the way in which the 
communication envisaged by the Committee is somewhat one-way in direction. 
With respect to visitors, the Committee recommend the creation of a visitor centre, that 
more of an effort be made to make people feel welcome at Westminster, that there be better 
access to various parts of the House, and that standing committee information be presented to 
people in a way that can be better understood.43 At one level, it is actually an indictment of 
parliament that a report must include the recommendation to make people feel welcome when 
they visit: a hospitable building should be a given. However, as the vast majority of the 
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electorate are unlikely to visit parliament, the impact of these kinds of suggestions on 
disengagement is perhaps minimal. 
The report also listed a number of ways to make it easier for the media to report what 
goes on in parliament, informed by the evidence that parliament receives less media attention 
than in the past. The Committee recognised the need for ‘a more organised, professional and 
strategic approach to its relations with the media’.44 It recognised that there had been 
advances in this regard, and called for the establishment of a central press office and for 
greater coordination of the communications of the House.45 However, the remainder of its 
recommendations involved some changes to the way Hansard is published and that there be 
consideration of allowing journalists to take laptops into the press gallery.46 These later kinds 
of recommendations are not of the same scale as those suggested by the Puttnam 
Commission, and, again, seem so obvious that it is remarkable that a select committee was 
required to produce them. 
However, perhaps the most interesting of the recommendations, in terms of what they 
reveal about how the Committee conceptualised the linkage function, were those relating to 
public petitions and provision of information for the public. With respect to public petitions, 
the Modernisation Committee went no further than recommending that other House 
committees consider whether public petitions should automatically be referred to the relevant 
select committee, which would then decide whether or not to conduct an enquiry, and that the 
House should accept petitions in both typescript and manuscript (!).47 Given that public 
petitions can be a crucial way for the electorate to express concerns and grievances to 
parliament, and to begin a process of communication about such concerns and grievances, it is 
perhaps surprising that the Committee did not wish to go further with its recommendations, as 
both the Puttnam and Power Commissions subsequently did. 
This kind of restraint was also evident in the reports suggestions about provision of 
information for the public: even the title of this section of the report suggests that there is only 
a one-way communication process present. The report recommended further improvements to 
the parliamentary website, to supplement that changes that had already been made in recent 
years. However, the section on ‘interactivity’ is particularly revealing with respect to how the 
Committee viewed the nature of communication between parliament and public. The report 
notes that digital media are ‘interactive’ and ‘capable of conveying users’ feedback’.48 This 
italicised phrase could have been replaced with many different other ones that could have 
captured the essence of two-way, meaningful communication between parliament and the 
electorate, and the kind of participation and deliberation that digital technology makes 
possible. The chosen phrase – ‘conveying users’ feedback’ – is one-dimensional in nature and 
suggestive of a relationship in which the public must be kept at arms-length, despite rhetoric 
to the contrary. The report does include the recommendation that parliament should make 
more use of on-line consultation in order to ‘take account of the views of the wider public’, 
and includes commendations that parliament has received for the way in which it has 
pioneered such consultations. However, as possibly one of the most useful ways in which 
parliament could foster deeper and more meaningful linkages with the public, discussion of 
on-line consultations stretches to only seven paragraphs, and there is no discussion of how 
these processes could be used more strategically and methodologically. This section of the 
report concludes with a recommendation that the Commons publish a newsletter for the 
public and that the website be developed with the interests of young people in mind.49 This 
section on providing information to the public, then, does not go much beyond just that – it 
recommends improvements to how information is presented and fed to the public, but 
declines to engage in discussions about how to establish a proper dialogue with the public, to 
foster the kind of discussion and deliberation that both the Puttnam and Power Commissions 
suggested was the first essential step in enabling people to feel that they are being listened to 
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and in creating the conditions in which they can feel more involved in decision-making 
processes. A little over a year after the Committee’s report, progress has been made on some 
of its recommendations: suggestions for a new voters’ guide, for example, has been acted 
upon.50 However, there has been little progress made in many other areas: at the time of 
writing, none of the Commons’ select committees were engaged in on-line consultations. 
The relative temerity of the recommendations made by the Modernisation Committee 
should come as no real surprise: the executive dominates life in the House of Commons, and 
is unlikely to acquiesce with reforms that will make parliament a more effective forum for 
dialogue with the electorate, because of the impact this might have on its own relative power 
base at Westminster. But what is of most interest is what the report begins to reveal about the 
way parliamentarians think about their relationship with the public, and how they 
conceptualise the linkage function that parliament should fulfil. This initial survey of the 
Modernisation Committee’s report suggests that MPs struggle to conceptualise parliament’s 
linkage role, and consequently struggle to envisage useful ways of improving how it performs 
that role. Of course, as noted, MPs thoughts on this issue, as with any issue, are distorted 
through the lens of party government and the way it structures life at Westminster. Yet, even 
at a more basic level, it is clear that while some MPs may well be pausing for thought with 
regards to disengagement and its impact on parliament, there are problems with the way they 
are approaching the linkage function at the start of the twenty-first century. The Power 
Commission indicated as much, when it referred to the ‘tetchiness’ of some MPs during the 
course of their evidence sessions. The author recently conducted a short series of interviews 
with a small number of MPs and peers, 18 in total in January and February 2006, and these 
serve to support such a finding, and simultaneously illustrate the difficulties that MPs have 
with the twin issues of addressing disengagement and enhancing the relationship between 
parliament and people. A brief review of this qualitative evidence helps explain the nature of 
the dilemma. 
 
MP’s Perceptions of Disengagement and Parliament’s Linkage Function 
When asked about their thoughts on the reasons for apparently increasing disengagement 
from traditional political processes and institutions, of the 18 individuals interviewed, 11 gave 
answers which, to one degree or another, referred to the key reasons provided by the recent 
Puttnam and Power Commissions. The most common response, particularly from MPs, was 
that there are no ideological divides between the main parties anymore, and that the parties 
are too similar in outlook to be appealing to the electorate, with several other interviewees, 
particularly the peers, pointing to party domination as a reason for disengagement.  
Only four interviewees flagged up the most important reason, at least as identified by 
Puttnam and Power: that people are disengaged because they don’t feel they can influence 
political outcomes. As one Labour MP explained: 
 
There’s a discontinuity between the act of voting and any results that might come 
from it … Even when someone’s directly contacted their MP, they can’t see how 
democratic politics actually makes a difference. (Interview, 31 January 2006) 
 
Another Labour MP explained disengagement in the context of ‘people think[ing] that 
parliament, not that it’s irrelevant, but that nothing they can do can actually influence it … all 
these things fuel this feeling that parliament is either irrelevant, it doesn’t listen, or that there 
are more interesting things to do with your life’ (interview, 31 January 2006). A Labour peer 
made reference to the role of influence, although in the context that people felt they could not 
influence things because public affairs had become far more complicated, resulting in ‘a 
feeling of being overwhelmed and frustrated’ (interview, 10 January 2006). A Liberal 
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Democrat peer stated that, as a result of the centralisation of government, ‘people have a 
feeling of being remote from things’ (interview, 30 January 2006). 
However, several interviewees provided accounts of disengagement that fall into the 
‘red herring’ camp identified by the Power Commission. The same Liberal Democrat peer just 
mentioned above also argued that disengagement was the result of ‘people [being] more 
engaged in a vast range of other things’, coupled with a succession of governments with large 
majorities. One Conservative MP disputed that there was any disengagement, noting that 
‘participation is there, but voting turnout is not as it has been’ (interview, 11 January 2006), 
which slightly misses the point that there has indeed been a disengagement from the 
traditional way of ‘doing’ democracy in the UK. Two interviewees responded with the 
argument that economic prosperity caused disengagement, a viewpoint dismissed by both the 
Puttnam and Power Commissions. One Labour MP argued that ‘people are enjoying a level of 
prosperity that is unprecedented and so are less concerned with how they are governed’ 
(interview, 1 February 2006). A Liberal Democrat MP was sceptical about disengagement, 
stating that the levels of engagement had been overestimated in the past. This was attributed 
to ‘nostalgia’ and notions of ‘the good old days when everyone sat around the fireside talking 
about politics’ (interview, 10 January 2006). This MP also argued that ‘people get engaged in 
politics when they’re really fed up and want to change politics’, and in this regard ‘it’s a bit 
like going to the doctor: you don’t whinge unless you’re ill.’ 
Of particular interest are the responses from the interviewees when asked what they 
thought parliament ought to do, as the basis of representative democracy in the UK, in order 
to address the problem of political disengagement. Crucially, none of the interviewees 
suggested changes specifically geared towards enabling people to be more involved in 
consultation or decision-making processes. Even those interviewees who pointed to a lack of 
influence and being listened to as a reason why people were disengaging did not go on to 
mention any kind of deliberative or participative democratic mechanisms that could be used 
to complement representative democracy at Westminster. The responses to this question 
produced a range of answers, from ‘blue sky’ approaches designed to alter the institutional 
structure of the political system, such as overhauling the electoral system and radically 
reforming the select committee system, to rather more modest suggestions such as holding a 
series of seminars between parliament and the media to improve working practices.  
Although only a small number of interviewees indicated that a lack of influence and a 
sense of being ignored were the causes of disengagement, these issues did come to the fore 
when parliamentarians were asked their views on what we might see when parliament was 
fulfilling its linkage function in an ideal world. This question gave interviewees some pause 
for thought, and some of the answers suggest that several of them did not have a vision in 
their head of what they ought to be aspiring to in terms of parliament’s relationship with the 
public. One MP stated that ‘I’m not taken with the idea of having an idealistic model of what 
parliament ought to be’ (interview, 31 January 2006), while a peer suggested the question was 
‘almost impossible to answer’ (interview, 30 January 2006). Of course, there is difference in 
having a perfect model to which an institution should try to aspire, and actually implementing 
a perfect model, but both these answers suggest a lack of rigorous thought about how 
parliament should be fulfilling this crucial function to the best of its ability. For another MP, 
the ideal linkage performance involved a parliament that could ‘mediate the concerns of the 
public’ (interview, 1 February 2006), with the idea of mediation being the traditional 
approach to the linkage function that disengagement suggests is no longer sufficient. For 
several interviewees, the linkage function was best performed when parliament did more and 
better scrutiny, had more committee autonomy, or had better communication processes in 
place. Another MP indicated that the linkage function was already being performed as well as 
it could be through the constituency linkage (interview, 30 January 2006). Three interviewees 
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were clear, however, that the ideal of the linkage function involved parliament being 
responsive to the public. One Liberal Democrat MP emphasised that there had to be 
responsiveness in terms of representation and also between elections, and that, in order to 
increase communication between MPs and the public, the role of the parties at Westminster 
had to be curtailed (interview, 31 January 2006). A Labour MP stated that: 
 
It would have to be responsive, be seen to be relevant, it would have to address issues 
that concern people. I suppose it would have to deal with issues in a mature and 
considered way, and process and procedure is a huge part of what we do here. In an 
ideal world, laws are made when people have the opportunity to have an input, and 
what they say is considered. Of course, that doesn’t happen, and that’s why people 
get frustrated. (interview, 31 January 2006) 
 
However, despite this analysis, this MP did not then go on to suggest exactly how parliament 
could be more responsive, in terms of any new mechanisms or procedures it could introduce 
or adopt that might help with responsiveness and enabling people to ‘have an input’. Another 
Liberal Democrat peer made similar comments about the need for responsiveness, and about 
how parliament was seen to be ignoring people: 
 
There’s a general perception that parliament and politicians don’t listen, and if they 
don’t listen, why engage? There’s been some efforts to encourage politicians to be 
more active in their constituencies. But people don’t think they’re terribly 
consultative, and perhaps they could be more engaged with their constituents. 
(interview, 30 January 2006) 
 
Yet this did not translate into suggestions for how this increased responsiveness could be 
achieved. This peer did state that changing the style and timing of debates parliamentary 
debates would help, but this is not a mechanism that in itself facilitates engagement in terms 
of deliberation or participation. 
Finally, some of the material collected during the interviews suggested that some MPs 
are entirely oblivious of how their views of parliament’s linkage role may actually be 
contributing to disengagement. One Labour MP recounted a story about the representations 
received with regards to legislation banning smoking in public places. This MP had been 
‘quite annoyed’ by an individual who had made the case for banning smoking completely and 
had been forceful in the arguments she made. The MP had responded that ‘MPs use their own 
judgements on issues, and don’t take orders from constituents’, (interview, 30 January 2006). 
This MP also expressed annoyance at constituents who call up and say ‘you’re MP, you must 
do something’, which apparently prompts the MP in question to reply, ‘I’m not your MP, I 
represent lots of people, not just you’, which seems unlikely to be the kind of response 
designed to encourage people to engage in politics. Several other MPs also pointed to 
concerns they had about the mailbag they received from individuals who wrote on behalf of 
the interest and pressure groups with which they were involved, and indicated that they 
viewed such communications as problematic, rather than an opportunity to gauge the views of 
those members of the electorate who join pressure groups rather than political parties. A 
number of MPs, although not many, also expressed sympathy with their colleagues who 
refuse to have email addresses, because it tended to encourage poorly thought out, knee-jerk 
correspondence from people. None of these MPs agreed with the idea that these were just the 
types of communication mechanisms that might encourage engagement from those who may 
not otherwise become engaged, although internet and email communications were approved 
by most of those interviewed (although for most, these were cited first and foremost as ways 
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for MPs to inform constituents of various things, rather than an opportunity for two-way 
dialogue). Perhaps worryingly (or perhaps predictably) it was the unelected peers in the 
House of Lords who seemed most exercised by the problem of disengagement and how to 
respond to it, with many of their Commons’ colleagues seeming rather more relaxed about the 
matter. 
 
Conclusions  
This conference paper represents the first step in a broader research project that seeks to 
examine the linkage function performed by parliament in terms of its relationship with the 
public at large, as opposed to interest groups or constituency linkages, and as such, it does not 
pretend to offer any definitive answers. Work is on-going to analyse how MPs are thinking 
about their linkage role and their relationship with the public, how this fits with the traditional 
understandings of how this linkage should be performed, and what the disjuncture between 
the perspective of MPs and the implications of disengagement means for how we think about 
linkage. 
However, the exploratory nature of the paper has enabled useful comparisons to be 
made between how extra-parliamentary organisations are viewing the current problems with, 
and solutions to, political disengagement, with the way in which parliamentarians are 
approaching the issue. What this highlights is, perhaps not surprisingly, a real gulf between 
the Commissions and the parliamentarians both in terms of identifying the problem and 
suggesting solutions. The Modernisation Committee largely failed to point to the evidence 
that disengagement is largely driven by the fact that people feel they cannot influence 
decision making and are not listened to by politicians. As both the Puttnam and Power 
Commissions argued, very specific responses are required to this problem, which should 
begin, however tentatively, to provide opportunities for people to become involved and active 
with traditional political institutions and processes in a way they find meaningful. Such 
involvement is unlikely to be secured quickly, but steps seem required that will complement 
representative democracy with enhanced participative and deliberative democracy. Despite 
figures from the Audit of Engagement that suggests that only 11% of people would get 
involved in consultation processes, it seems likely that assessments of such processes will 
depend on whether or not people think it is a genuine consultation or simply an exercise for 
appearance sake. Research suggests that when people are involved in consultation and policy 
processes where they actually affect decision making at some level, they are far more 
supportive of the process, feel they can influence things, and that politics is a worthwhile 
pursuit.51 
Yet the Modernisation Committee approach to the problem was located well within the 
traditional parameters of representative government, where parliament simply works to keep 
people informed about what is being done on their behalf, which is just the sort of thing that, 
at least on its own, is unappealing to those who are currently disengaged. Even setting aside 
the resource and structural implications of any democratic innovations that might be 
attractive, MPs seem unwilling to rethink how they, both individually and institutionally, 
fulfil the crucial linkage function, and what their relationship with the public ought to be 
based on. The traditions of the historically-rooted Westminster system, as with any institution, 
do not easily change to meet new circumstances. At least for the time being, this is one 
example of where exogenous change does not seem to be prompting internal institutional 
change.  
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